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Introduction 
This essay presented today as part of the XXV.World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy  /  25.  Weltkongress  der  Internationalen  Vereinigung  für  Rechts-  und 
Sozialphilosophie, is an integral part of the ongoing investigation that the author is currently 
carrying out on his doctoral thesis in law at the External University of Colombia, Which deals 
with the dogmatic category of crime of Breach of duty, their implications for the authorship and 
participation, and its philosophical underpinning in the tradition of German idealism.   
Society in the new millennium is much more complex than its immediate reference, as a 
result crime has evolved in a more worrying form and society has the expectation that the rule of 
law,  its  law/status,  provides  policy  responses  to  socio-legal  reality  increasingly  rampant. 
However,  all  these  needs  are  taken  into  account  at  postmodern  dialectic  on  the  sanction 
formulation devised by G. F. W. Hegel (1770 – 1831). The contextualization of its own that 
requires a brand new concept of the hermeneutic circle (text, context and person) they purported 
to at least explain the role of the right to punish ius puniendi. The rule of law in its punitive 
award must face a double tort challenge of context on these procedures; on the one hand, the 
behaviors performed by individuals without any special skills and are governed by the criteria of 
interpretation of the theory of the lord of fact; and other behaviors displayed by a particular 
obligation (intraneus) that serves a specific duty to clear nature of parole and not to be confused 
with the inherent duty to the legal. Today this concept is governed by the theory of breach of duty 
crimes. That parole duty is a normative concept that has not yet been sufficiently developed by  
2 
the contemporary doctrine and is especially relevant for the indication that will be covered by 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. múltp. Claus Roxin (München) with the contributions of Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. 
múltp.  Günther  Jakobs  (Bonn)  explains  the  concepts  of  competition  for  organizing  and 
institutional  competition  that  highlights  the  relevant  criminal  behavior  thanks  to  the  state 
genuinely duties. This essay is intended to mean the dogmatic development of modern German 
concepts with approaches undertaken by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. múltp. Jürgen Habermas, who from 
his  works:  a)  Theorie  des  kommunikativen    Handelns.  Band  I.  Handlungsrationalität  und 
gesellschaftliche  Rationalisierung.  Autor:  Jürgen  Habermas.  ©  1981,  Suhrkamp  Verlag, 
Frankfurt  am  Main,  b)  Theorie  des  Kommunikativen  Handelns.  Band  II  Zur  Kritik  der 
Funktionalistischen Vernunft Autor: Jürgen Habermas. © 1981,  Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am 
Main,  y  c)  Faktizität  und  Geltung.  Beiträge  zur  Diskurstheorie  des  Rechts  und  des 
demokratischen  Rechtsstaats.  Suhrkamp  Verlag  Frankfurt  am  Main.  1992,  understand 
intersubjective relations based on substrate communicative actions (illocutionary or elocutionary) 
teleological actions (purpose-oriented), but always marked by the guideline language.  
From the relationship between these plexuses of knowledge, which is what Habermas calls 
the life world, there is criminal  conduct  as  a result of the damage itself originates from  the 
normative expectations that society placed on the rule of law. Legal acts are therefore speech acts 
that affect the daily lives when the city is confident that the rule, designed in essence dialogic, 
radiates characteristics of intangibility and immutability.   
An argumentative tour is also  part of this essay that goes back to the philosophical basics 
known as German idealism and stops at the thought of one of the most expensive exponents of 
transcendental  rationalism:  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804)  with  all  its  conceptual  stream  as 
definitive science of criminal law.  
 
I. Ontology of the Sentence 
The crime is the breakdown of communicative rationality between the factuality of an action and 
the validity of the standard concrete. The sentence, in turn, is a counterfactual reaffirmation of 
the validity rules by denying the denier event that produces the crime
12. What is communicated is 
                                                           
1  Presentation  by  Diego  Victoria  al  XXV.  World  Congress  of  Philosophy  of  Law  and  Social  Philosophy  /  25. 
Weltkongress  der  Internationalen  Vereinigung  für  Rechts-  und  Sozialphilosophie.  Frankfurt  am  Main,  15.  -  20. 
August 2011. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main Generalthema: "Recht, Wissenschaft und Technik" Congress 
theme: "Law, Science, Technology“. The author is professor of hermeneutics and legal logic in law school at the 
Libre  University  of  Colombia  in  Cali  (Valle  del  Cauca).  E-mails:  victoriaochoa@gmail.com  unt 
difervic@hotmail.com  
3 
not only regulatory contempt that inspires the subject policy, which is in itself the subject of the 
complaint, but breaking into the world of  the life of the understanding of a social integration 
system, constitute the sanction reinstatement of this communication. In respect, there is need for 
two (2) warnings in the forms of contextual explanation: a) the word action is raised and exposed 
throughout this thesis in its broader Kantian connotation as a possibility for public use at any time 
and  place,  one's  reason  rather  than  naturalistic  narrower  sense,  as  an  external  means  to  the 
corresponding sense of doing (default). Public use of reason is a subjective right, understood as 
the power to require other (required) intervention for what it does, thanks to a certain level of 
competence. It is a right to intersubjective recognition of the existence of individual freedom as a 
compatible  event  with  the  freedom  of  all.  It  is  the  same  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804
3)  who 
appeals to the general principles of reasoning. He considers the existence of a private reason as 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2  GUILLERMO  FEDERICO  HEGEL,  Philosophy  of  law,Editorial  Claridad,  5  th  edition,  1968,  Buenos  Aires 
(Argentina), German philosopher conceives crime as a dialectical relationship between  individual will and the law 
(p. 101 § 82), this falls as the antithesis of both in which a contradiction entails the restoration of the right to reject 
the denial of the crime. In § 90 (p. 103), § 91, § 92, § 93 (p. 104) man is considered a living being, so as a subject he 
can be subdued and subjugated, not by choice but by a law. Regulations will is synonymous with freedom, but force 
and violence that can seem unfair in its application involve the cancellation of the first violence (caused by the 
crime). Then it is a pedagogical controlled violence, overturning the barbarism and ignorance. We then have two (2) 
types of violence in Hegel:, a first violence, rooted in an act or omission that is what is directed against the contract, 
law, education or family (concept with ethical content) that violates the right to individual will and therefore violates 
the existence of human freedom through the crime (p. 105 § 95) and a second violence (p. 106 § 97), as a result of 
the other and  through the criminal law, will override the first, deny it, and assert itself (self-awareness). What 
appears to be a vindictive response to a disease that is caused (consistent) who has caused another bad (above), 
should be given its logical dimension: that the offense was denied for a violation of law as law (normative) enthroned 
the restoration of the provision violated (pp. 107 and 108 § 99). denial of evil is a reaffirmation of freedom (p. 106 § 
98). However, Immanuel Kant in his Metaphysics of Morals, editorial Tecnos, 1989, Bogota (Colombia), had already 
addressed this dialectical relationship based on the principle of contradiction explained as follows: the violation of 
freedom as a negative act is prevented by another negative act of coercion that is the power to constrain the will and 
compel it to respect the right, leading to a reaffirmation of freedom according to universal laws (p. 40). 
  
3  About  Immanuel  Kant,  what  is  Enlightenment? Beantwortung  der  frage:  Was  ist  Aufklärung?  Berlinische 
Monatsschrift. Dezember-Heft 1784. S. 481-494 “However, for this illustration only freedom is required and, indeed, 
the most harmless of all bearing that name, namely the freedom to make public use of reason itself, in any domain. 
But I hear everywhere exclaim: Do not argue! The officer says: Do not argue, drill! Financier: do not reason and pay! 
Pastor: Do not argue, believe! (One man says in the world: ¡Argue all you want and about what you want, but Obey!) 
Everywhere then,are limitations of freedom. But which one prevents the illustration and which, by contrast, promotes 
it? Here is my answer:  Public use of reason must always be free, and it is the only one who can produce the 
Enlightenment of men. Private use, however, must often be severely limited without impeding progress of illustration 
in any particular way. I understand by public use of reason itself that someone makes it, as a scholar, and to the 
entire public world of readers. I call private use employment of reason which enables man in a civilian position or 
function  entrusted  to  him.  However,  in  many  occupations  pertaining  to  the  interest  of  the  community  certain 
mechanisms are needed, through which some members have to behave as purely passive, so that, by some artificial 
unanimity, the government directs them toward public purposes , or at least to limit their  destruction. Naturally, in 
this case it is not allowed to reason, but must obey.  But as for this part of the machine, one is considered a member 
of a whole or even of a cosmopolitan society; as it is estimated as the scholar who, by letters,  addresses to an 
audience in its own right, can reason above all, without necessarily suffering the occupations assigned to it partly as 
a passive member. “Thus, for example, it would be very dangerous if an officer, who must obey their superiors, 
began to argue loudly, while on duty, about the appropriateness or usefulness of the order received”.   
4 
logical inverse of public reason, which is defined as referring to people linked to society thanks to 
a direct functional relationship. The public servant shall not, in the performance of his functions 
and  objectives  as  a  subordinate,  challenge  state  tax  compliance  plexus,  since  the  concept  of 
private reason obliges him to act in accordance with an institutional guarantor position and b) the 
communicative action is based as a category
4  of inter-relationship. Taking a step ahead of the 
site  at  which  Kant  had  established,  with  reference  to  the  transcendent  subject  but  full  of 
individuality-, communicative action through which addresses three (3) complex themes: i) the 
concept of communicative rationality as a category at the same time the action is used to treat 
cognitive-instrumental reductionism which is the subject of reason, ii) the concept of society 
divided into two levels, which combines the paradigms of lifeworld and system 
5, and iii) a theory 
of  modernity  that  gives  an  explanation  to  what  Jürgen  Habermas  (1929)  called    social 
pathologies  -  which  one  might  wonder  whether  the  offense  is  regarded  as  one  -  under  the 
following  assumptions:  the  communicatively  structured  areas  of  action  are  subject  to  the 
constraints of formally organized action systems that have become autonomous
6. Clarified before 
it becomes a warning: It is that the rationale that guides this thesis is its initial formulation in the 
theory of communicative action (1987) developed by Jürgen Habermas within a framework of 
rationality and rationalization of social action (Volume I) and critique of reason functionalist 
(volume ii) and in actuality and validity (1998)-on the right and the democratic state of law in 
terms  of  discourse  theory
7  -  That  without  giving  up  arguments  raised  by  Georg  Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), takes the Kantian development of pure practical reason embodied 
in the critique of practical reason (2005) and Metaphysics of Morals (1989)
8  but as formulating 
a theory of modernity with all the implications that this entails. A conception of punishment, 
                                                           
4 Conception of communicative action as a category implies distinguishing this a priori concept of transcendent 
subject (Kant) from the post concept of the thing (Aristotle), because while the former is of pure character, the 
second  has  a  sensitive  nature.  When  the  categories  relate  to  the  subject,  they  are  time  and  space,  while  when 
referring to the thing, they are attributes of the self-rex, constituting its ontological reality: shape, weight, volume, 
capacity, quantity, color, flavor, smell, texture and gender.   
5 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Theory of Communicative Action I. Rationality and Rationalization of Social Action, 
Editorial Taurus. t. 1, second edition, Madrid 2001, pg. 10. 
6  Ibíd, p. 10. 
7 Accredited dates here correspond to the Castilian versions translated by Manuel Jimenez round of the German -
language original: a)  Theorie des kommunikaliven  Handelns.  Band I. Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche 
Rationalisierung.  Autor:  Jürgen  Hab ermas.  ©  1981,  Suhrkamp  Verlag,  Frankfurt  am  Main,  b)  Theorie  des 
Komunikativen Handelns. Band II Zur Kritik der Funktionalistischen Vernunft  Autor: Jürgen Habermas. © 1981,  
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, y c) Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Dis kurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratieschen Rechtsstaats. Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main. 1992. 
8 Castilian versions of works in German: a) Kritik der praktischen Vernunft y b) Metaphysik der Sitten (1.797). 
  
5 
which is our starting point, and restoration of communication that actually confirms the rules of 
society, cannot be criticized by classifying it as a remote viewing of the empirical and accused of 
taking  refuge  in  nebulous  spaces  of  absolute  idealism.  The  revival  of  the  rule  with  the 
intervention of the sentence is presented in the real world where communication is maintained 
throughout the complaint process and continues the execution of the sanction. 
Society as a subsystem in the world of life is the context where the communication that is not 
really  unknown  ontological,  teleological  evil  against  another  evil,  but presented  in  a  double 
connotation: a) empirical, instrumental, b) remuneration-functional. the sanction is not an end in 
itself, it is a means of communicative reason and is aimed at creating a budget policy of social 
equilibrium  in  the  factual  world,  which  tends  to  occur:  a)  a  change  in  the  actor  (special  -
preventive  function) like representing in  the collective consciousness an image of containment 
(general -preventive function)
 9. Interference with the law is projected in the socio-legal like a 
demonstration, ultimately, a symbolic interaction subject to end. To ensure real trust and not 
merely  counterfactual  the  sentence  has  a  function:  cognitive  safeguarding  the  life  of  the 
standard
10 if the cognitive rationality is taken from an area mentioned empirical - instrumental  -
teleological end action- a concept of rationality will originate as a comprehensive statement of 
the society within the objective world -modernity purely- contingent adapted to an environment
11. 
On the contrary, if the rationality is assumed from the communicative theory based on  acts of 
speech, the concept of rationality acquires a major dimension carrying inside a certain area of 
competition (competence) -Where there is a sentence, the legal duty parole and crime seen as a 
breach of that duty- the following assumptions: a) consensus about the validity of rule of law as 
an imperative, b) recognition of communicative action as a category linked to the end that is 
inserted into the daily c) legitimization of the communicative function  –Illocutionary- of the 
sentence as: i) self-emerged as a result of the intervention of the right to punish, as speech act, 
produced by the inter-state breakdown of existing dialogue, ii) reconfiguration of the social order 
through the assertion of regulatory budgets, and d) the assumption of the tangibility of extra penal 
                                                           
9GÜNTHER JAKOBS. Professor emeritus of criminal law and legal philosophy at the University of Bonn. State 
punishment: the meaning and purpose, pg6. German title: Staatliche Strafe; Bedeutung und Zweck, Opladen, 2004. 
Manuel Cancio Melia  translation and Bernardo Feijoo Sánchez Autonomous University of Madrid.(Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid). 
10JESÙS-MARÍA SILVA SÁNCHEZ.From abstract right to the real right.  Recession  to  Günther  Jakobs.  State 
punishment: the meaning and purpose (translation and preliminary study by M. Cancio Meliá y B. Feijóo Sánchez ), 
Thomson-Civitas, Madrid, 2006, 182 pp. indret magazine for the analysis of law. Barcelona October 2006.  
11 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Theory of Communicative Action I. Rationality of Action and Social Rationalization, p. 
27.  
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legal duties, which are not provided by the legislature as explicit policy ingredients, specific 
types of substantive order, set a broadcast communication counter intuitively founded in breach 
of the preservation of the duty incumbent upon the special obligor. 
Punishment, not being an end in itself, is redefined as an act of speech and not merely the 
policy response; it is the restoration of communication that reflects the social consensus to be 
imposed as more rational than formally ensure the configuration of the objective world as it 
existed before the transgression of the areas of competence. The crime does not deny the crime 
communicability  between  legal  transversal  category  rules  that  connects  with  the  individual 
systems  and  society.  Denying  involvement  in  the  crime  which  represents  the  image  by  the 
sentence, is itself a restoration of the validity claims as a rational framework in the social context, 
it became a double interference: a) against the person of the author, and b) the world of life. but it 
should be clear that the consensus is not achieved by an expectation of signing an agreement that 
can be dismissed as naive and that develops between the actor's behavior and what the standard 
as  expressed  speech  act  in  general,  but  by  the  consensus  of  an  original  social  contract  that 
requires the rule of law to restore that communication so this tax if they are entitled. 
 
II. Communicative Functional Concept of the Crime of Breach of Duty 
The social context presents relations between the basic and social subsystems that generate fields 
of  competence:  a)  cultural  reproduction,  b)  social  integration,  and  c)  economic  and  political 
socialization, that lead to consider the person as a subject capable of speech and action that makes 
use of knowledge so that emissions or linguistic expressions express explicitly on knowledge 
(know how) and teleological actions are expressed as a power, an implicit knowledge (know 
that).  Against  this,  Habermas  states  that  rationality  is  predicated  on:  a)  persons  who  have 
knowledge, b) expressions that may be communicative or non-communicative, c) actions that 
may be linguistic or nonlinguistic d) symbolic or symbolic expressions. In modern criminal law 
as a cultural product of the people, this plays a decisive role in the established institutional order 
in which the citizen belongs to, need to adapt their behavior to the prevailing regulatory system. 
This importance is evident in the establishment of the dogmatic category of crime of breach of 
duty,  discovered  perhaps  intuitively  by  Roxin  Claus  (1931)  when  he  presented  the  trial 
Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (1963)
12 as enabling writing to the Chair of Criminal Law at the 
                                                           
12 CLAUS ROXIN. Authorship and Mastery of Fact in Criminal Law.Marcial Pons. Legal Issues. Translation by 
Joaquín Cuello Contreras y José Luis Serrano González (Universidad de Extremadura)University of Extremadura.  
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University of Munich, which states that over the domain category of crimes, there is a category of 
crime of breach of duty understood as words of prof. Roxin, such as those in which the domain is 
not the fact that based upon authorship but a special duty violation parole
 13. 
What is communicated in such events is a response to normative expectation generating 
legislative text, speech act's illocutionary as well as going perlocutionary coupled with the intent 
and  understanding  of  the  content  of  text  wherein  the  special  obligation  (intraneus  )  has  a 
particular target. This subject communicates with his conduct in accordance with its functional 
role, a security policy response to the breach of duty of which he is guarantor.  
However, the assumption in this historical moment in that category is not occasional tort is 
the result of an evolutionary process that runs in the so-called German idealism, which needs to 
be conveniently explained. 
 
III. The Criminal Legal Voyage of German Idealism in the XVIII and XIX Centuries 
The rational view of the law by the German idealism of the XVIII and XIX centuries was not 
uniform, being able to say that every one of their representatives, viewed as edges of a complex 
geometric figure, did not speak in unison. It was to some extent, the special features that these 
philosophers printed on their line of thinking. However, there is a common denominator in all 
this  concept  building  that  remains  intangible  through  the  various  schemes  that  integrate 
argumentative, giving life epistemological and by frequent recurrence in each of these rational 
structures  can  be  examined  from  a  historical  perspective  with  a  continuity  solution:  i)  the 
idealism does not  come from  the assumption of reality as the realization of external things, 
given in the world, but from I, also known as subject or consciousness, ii) The being is contained 
in the subject's consciousness, there emerges the real fact that comprehensive ontos  is the object 
of knowledge. iii) the subject (I) is the creator, generator of anti-normative behaviors that fall 
short of expectations balance of civil society by the other subjects (alter). But society in turn, 
supports  such  negative  feedback  mechanism  of  the  act  of  infringement,  that  at  the  end  and 
dialectically is but the affirmation of the validity of normative postulate. To reach this point of 
the question, recognition of the event itself that the guideline of the philosophy of criminal law 
passed by Germany
14 must make clear who was Cartesius Renatus (1596-1650), who as a hinge 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Madrid 1998 taken from the 6 th edition of Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft. Edit. Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1994. 
13 Op. Cit. Pág. 700.  
14 As such, but for the understanding of philosophy in general, Eusebi Colomer, German thought from Kant to 
Heidegger, Editorial Herder. t. 1, 1993, p. 1.  
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between two worlds the medieval and the modern, lays the foundation of rational knowledge 
from cogito, ergo sum, where the subject is an individual in is self-confident and reconstructs 
reality from that knowledge. Cartesian philosophical system will present a vision that moves the 
body and installs the individual subject, what prevails is not the external event but me and my 
thoughts. Against the existence of others, which stand as a Pharaonic monument is doubt as an 
anti-error method
15 , because only there you have the virtue of being thought of in terms of 
certainty  by  the  subject  (me).  The  struggle  between  Cartesian    idealism
16  and metaphysical 
Cartesian with their problems (the world, me and God) is evident.  
Ego idealism (subject to conscious understanding and will) will have decisive influence in 
criminal  legal  science.  Immersed  in  a  world  where  there  is  no  solo,  intersubjectively  will 
understand that the scope of their actions will have daily impact on specific Print value of the 
other subjects. 
 
[...] Man is understood in its core essence as a subject for which the body becomes an object of thought. 
the beginning of the Cartesian philosophy, with its famous cogito, ergo sum, modern thought definitely 
focused around the human subject [...]
17 
 
The subject is an individual, who eagerly seeks alone and perhaps with anguish the ultimate 
foundation  of  the  thinking  structure,  of  its  cognitive  capacity,  creating  thought  as  a  proper 
element of rationality. Ontological separation between the object of knowledge and the cognitive 
subject, there for the universe of beings is displaced by a new activity that is inherent to me: The 
ability to think rationally and infer the intended purpose. At this point and time of philosophical 
thinking begins what Platon (428-347 a.c.) denominated in his context δευτερʿς πλʿυς –second 
                                                           
15  With  respect,  MANUEL  GARCIA  MORENTE,  preliminary  lessons  of  philosophy,  editorial  Zaragüeta 
Bengoechea, 1947, Madrid, p. 108 et seq, for whom the virginity and innocence of the second discards sailors has 
been completely lost because of the huge burden of lived experiences and contexts over the past twenty centuries 
preceding  Parmenides  as  the  first  rider.  Descartes  has  the  huge  responsibility  of  bringing  the  ship  to  safety 
philosophy and perhaps avoiding shipwreck aground in the rough waters of finding skepticism quietest on the direct 
relationship between the subject and thought and not between the subject and the thing with the intermediation of the 
concept of something so dear to the Aristotelian system.   
16 For the idealism as philosophical, the only s ure thing there is of existing is the self (I) and the thing adquires 
relevance as it makes direct contact with me. Such a situation created by Descartes, that by way of "first man" begins 
the second navigation. That earned him to strong questionings about  his system by the genuine German idealists of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, often often referred to as an ideal realism or real idealism.  
17  Ibíd, EUSEBI COLOMER, TheGerman thoughts of Kant to Heidegger, p. 8.  
9 
navigation-
18 and that would lead to a Copernican revolution where the center of gravity of the 
cognitive action is not the object but the subject who knows. Reversing the interpretation 
concerning the understanding, it is no longer the object that determines the subje ct but is the 
subject that creates and determines the object. A paradigm shift occurs between two perspectives, 
that  of  acting  and  thinking.  On  the  one  hand,  classical  philosophy  of  marked  strain  onto-
theological  and  the  other,  the  modern  philosophy  that  underpins  its  equilibrium  point  in 
anthropological criteria. 
Plexus  implications  of  such  criminal  epistemological  rupture  conducted  by  discards  are 
notorious because it is not needed for the mediation of the concept to define the entity (thing in 
itself) and convert it into thinking itself. The path was pointed out for future contractarians like 
Marquis of Beccaria (1738-1794) conceived the basis of the sentence rather than the punishment 
itself (real thing) but the need of Prince to protect and safeguard (direct and individual thought) 
partial transfers of sovereignty by way of deposit were delivered by an assembly of people. This 
way of conceiving the sentence does not need mediation from other concepts
19, the idea of crime 
and punishment is a result of a di rect thought of the philosopher of the Italian Enlightenment 
when he understood the criminal law as a system of protection and safeguarding individual rights 
that is central to all combinations of the globe
20. by stripping the power of devoting particular 
offenses or circumscribe the sovereign and the laws produced by the activity of a legislator who 
represents the representation of a community united by a social contract, makes such laws in 
direct object of a thought.  
                                                           
18 The term δευτερʿς πλʿυς –second navigation-was used by Platón in his VII Letter that has the title “Platónwishes 
luck to Dión’s relatives and friends” and was written around the year  353 a.c. when the philosopher was seventy 
five years old ans in its place, giving multiple interpretations to its original sense. The concept of second navigation 
is maritime and refers to the moment of momentum of a boat sailing in the waters. The first sailing is what is 
achieved by the speed of the winds and the second sailing is what is achieved by force of oars. Platón considers that 
the second force is the  overcoming of ʦυσική - physis by λʿγότυπʱ - -logos- the reason on the physical, giving rise 
to metaphysics which allows man to free himself from his naturalistic bonds and soar from the reality-as a platform- 
to the world of ideas. In the Platonic view, the second sailing is the one the philosopher makes once it his obligatory 
historical precedent is clear, but overcomes from rationality the concepts of  Πόλις, ʿ άνθρωπʿς κʱι τʿ σύμπʱν –
polis, man and cosmos. Plato's allegorical second navigation applies to the emergence of philosophy of modern 
German idealism which shines on the horizon with light.   
19 In the Aristotelian system concepts are an approximation to the real thing from the very definition of giving a 
chance for doubt. One thing is typical action to the extent that fully suits the budgets previously set by a guy who 
embodies, but this requires having the concept of typical action has inserted the thinking subject from what others 
devote normatively. It is an understanding by association while the Cartesian way that requires us to dispense with 
concepts is already taken by the experience and create, giving rise to what Kant later would call a priori structure of 
thought that will seek to explain reality as a result of  the laws of logic synthesis of our thinking (García Morente, 
1,947, p. 13). An action is not typical only because it is consecrated legislatively: It is typical because the typical 
stands  as  a  guarantee  of  freedom  enshrined  in  the  maxim:  everything  that  is  not  legally  prohibited  is  legally 
permitted.   
20 CESARE BECCARÍA, Of Crime and Punishment, Linotype Bolivar( Linotipia Bolívar). Bogota, 1992 11.   
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The enduring recognition given to Rene Descartes (1596-1650) comes from the novelty of his 
thought, marks the boundary that distinguishes two philosophically distinct worlds; on one hand 
is the philosophy of being (being), that during the old age reached its maximum edges in the 
enthronement of the thought  of  Parmenides of  Elea  (540/539-470 a.c)  which considered the 
existence of the being because it was actually a being, where nothing is not and thinking was like 
being. The being is not a product of thought
21 but the thought thinks what is, what exist, what is 
real, what is tangible. 
 
[...] In other words, metaphysical thought does not move on the ontic plane, relative to the reality as it is 
given,  but  at  the  ontological  concerning  λʿγʿς  del  'ʿν,  meaning  the  conditions  of  possibility  and 
intelligibility of the given reality to the metaphysical reality is not pure brute factuality or meaningless: It 
is intelligible. And this means that in the midst of its contingency and mutability, it has some elements of 
necessity and permanence that allowed his claim for thought. Metaphysics is imposed by task to look at 
anything, at all things, these items of need, permanence, and sufficiency that make up the fabric of reality 
intelligible. Thought otherwise could not say: the agency is this or that. Now,this metaphysical attempt to 
raise  the  'ʿν  al  λʿγʿς,  finding  the  sufficiens  ratio  of  the  body,  inevitably  leads  to  a  horizon  of 
transcendence. Indeed, given the reality is hardly intelligible in itself. Its character of not -needing, pushes 
the  thought  to  the  assertion  of  a  necessary  substance  in  which  it  can  put  to  rest  all  their  claims. 
Metaphysics thus receives the hallmark of transcendence, which we find in Platón , and is definitively 
established as its structure has been called, onto-theo-logical […]
22 
 
These initial characteristics of classical philosophy are referred to the etymological definition: a) 
onto b) theo c) logic and not the view of the context contempt with which Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) in Differenza und Identität (1957) with an indictment of the metaphysics of causing 
oblivion of being. In this first segment of what could be called realism onto-theo-logical can set 
the following aspects: 
1
st   For the metaphysics of the being reality is not understood as it is given but through the 
subject's capacity for insight of that reality. 
2
nd  The ontology of the being is not pure actuality, latent fact or reality without meaning, 
reality is understood, captured and taken by the person who knows that reality. 
                                                           
21 Ibíd. EUSEBI COLOMER, p. 8. 
22 Ibíd, p. 8-9.   
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3
rd Classical metaphysics understands reality as immutable, dynamic and essentially unique. 
What is understood is the fixed essence and not variable (not changing) of the thing. 
4
th The significance arises from the body (inside) to the other (the outside). What is real is 
not necessarily seen as the visible surface which itself brings deception and the role of the initial 
metaphysical is the knowledge of what is genuinely real, inner, necessary essence. 
Many centuries later, this concept would live in the German criminal legal philosopher with 
the development of the complex theory of action understood as a modification of the outside 
world and where the legally real is not measured by the objective production of a naturalistic 
outcome, but the valuation of the interpreter transcended internal areas of motivation and interest 
of the subject. From that point, the neo-Kantian views of the late twentieth century would find a 
teleologically  directed  action,  governed  by  the  will  of  the  subject  where  they  had  room  for 
phenomena like guilt, fraud and special spirits which were subjective elements of the criminal 
type.  On the other hand, the second segment that purifies metaphysical thought is  given in 
modernity with a fundamental change in architectural thinking and does not constitute a mere 
change of label. The foundation of cognative will not focus on the being, which is known, but 
rather the knower. Modernity does not sacrifice the being completely. Just overthrows the site 
where it was enthroned by several thousand years through the structure onto-theo-logic that had 
kept the thought of ancient and middle ages. The paradigm shift in the philosophical shed takes 
on the subject that takes a position that is no longer media but rather central in the process of 
knowledge. The purpose of assessment by the subject is the being that is known and that will give 
way to the realism vs. idealism controversy, meaning that the first is understanding of the thing 
and the second as understanding of the idea. At this time in the history of thought there is a 
multiple display of the subject (me) and will have special features for the criminal law to the 
extent that each of these schemes addresses the nature of repressive rule and the power of state to 
punish from a different mobility framework but with a common denominator. In the theory of 
legal  duty  we  can  say  that  contextualization  that  makes  German  idealism  in  the  process  of 
cognative where the subject occupies a central role is basilar. For this purpose it is necessary to 
distinguish between the individual subject of Descartes, the transcendental subject of Kant and 
the idealistic absolute subject itself
23. In Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) presents an interpretive turn 
                                                           
23 When approaching the understanding of German thought under the heading of idealism, one must be careful not to 
group in one basket three trends that although they had a common (the location of the subject) had deep differences 
on how to understand and explain the relationship of that individual with problematic issues such as: a) the state, b) 
the standard and c) the offense. Such a scenario is observed in the positions taken by Johann Gottlieb Fichte  (1762- 
12 
to the transcendental subject, understood as the sum of a priori structures that are given in a 
being capable of self-knowledge (thought) to enable the understanding of the object. But in the 
Königsberg thinker the object is inevitably linked to the subject and the true self consciousness 
can only be acquired in the act of cognative the object (other). Kant lays the foundation of the 
modern theory of guilt, where the understanding of the criminal act (self = intent) is embedded in 
the overall policy framework and required to suppress particular behavior. The subject becomes 
self-conscious of his action in so far as contemplating the naturalistic dimension of his behavior 
and can be attributed punitive consequences, then emerging relationship of the cognative subject 
(the actor sanctioned event) and the object of knowledge (the behavior described normatively). 
The  transcendental  subject  includes  the  object  within  a  process  of  introjection  from  a  priori 
structures of the subject (space and time), and their categories
24 to facilitate their knowledge. The 
Copernican revolution is no longer the object that determines the knowledge but the knowledge 
that determines the object and intervening sensitivity, understanding, and reason, where Kant 
refers to the definition of categories, which Aristotle had just originally conceived as pure 
concepts a priori given and not affected by the sensory perception of the thing
25 . The legal duty 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
1814),    Friedrich  Wilhelm  Joseph  Schelling  (1775-1854)  y  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  (1770-1831),  be  it  
notorious that the pattern of reflection in each of these thinkers was not uniform, and there is consensus in the 
academy to admit various stages of each of these systems. To the point of being commonly accepted labels like "the 
first Fichte," the old Schelling "or" the young Hegel. " references relate to the degree of maturity attained by his 
philosophy. However, the treatment of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is different because it represents the whole 
structure reflective system and independently of idealism as such, consistent with those in which the subject as the 
foundation of the knowledge process was transcendental character. His vision of law as an ethical building, governed 
by  laws  of  logic,  a  priori  synthetic  judgments  and  categorical  imperatives  placed  him  in  a  seat  for  autonomy 
dominant conceptual and deserves to be studied independently and extend its line rationalist in the vector began with 
idealism.    
24 By the way, see : IMMANUEL KANT, Kritik  der reinen Vennunft, Klincksieck. Berlín. 1918 p. 55, where: Die 
gleiche  Funktion,  die  Einheit  gibt  unterschiedliche  Darstellungen  bei  der  Verhandlung 
gibt  auch  Einigkeit  über  die  bloße  Synthesis  verschiedener  Vorstellungen  in  einer  Anschauung,  und 
dieses Gerät wird aufgerufen, mit den allgemeinen Ausdruck, der reine Begriff des Verstehens. Das wie Verständnis 
und mit den gleichen Maßnahmen, die in Folge logische Konzepte als Testversion von der Auswerteeinheit, legt auch 
durch die synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in der Anschauung überhaupt, transzendentalen Inhalt in seine 
Darstellungen, so llámanse diese Konzepte reinen Verstandes, die beziehen sich a priori auf Gegenstände, die im 
Allgemeinen nicht die Logik getan werden kann. Dies wird zu ebenso vielen reinen steigen priori Absprachen in 
bezug auf Gegenstände der Anschauung überhaupt, als Funktionen logisch überhaupt möglich Urteile in der obigen 
Tabelle  wurden:  für  das  Verständnis  wird  vollständig  durch  die  Funktionen  und  Fähigkeiten  voll  ausgeschöpft 
umarmte. Wir nennen diese Konzepte Kategorien, nach Aristoteles, für Unsere Absicht ist die gleiche wie Ihnen, am 
Anfang, aber bei weitem ihre Entwicklung. 
25  EUSEBI  COLOMER,  1993.  p19.  In  the  transcendental  constitution  of  the  object  involved  three  faculties: 
sensibility, understanding and reason.each is two-fold: It is both active and passive the sensitivity receives sense 
impressions and projects on the horizon including a priori of space and time.Thus establishing the phenomenon. 
receive understanding the phenomena of sensitivity and subsumed under the categories. This phenomenon carried 
over to the object. Finally, the reason  receives the items offered to the understanding and further referred to three 
centers of unity of experience: These three faculties are transcendental subjectivity thesis a priori structures that 
make knowledge possible.  
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that  converts  the  author  to  intraneus  who  works  against  an  institutional  role  that  has  been 
awarded is within the more rigid conception of Kantian, a pure priori concept, thus this anti 
policy act developed is part of transcendental subjectivity of the special obligation: him and no 
other because he has been assigned the jurisdiction that permits him to act being a person and 
respecting others as persons. 
 
That duty does not arise thanks to the ministry of law, though it is previously enshrined, it dates 
back to the structure of hypothetical judgments, which are formulated under the proposal:  
                      
         If A is B, then it is C,  
 
Where A is the parole duty to which professor Claus Roxin of München referred to when in 1963 
he structured the category of crime of breach of duty-pflichdelikte- because it rests exclusively on 
the role and the state committed that acts such attribution.  
B is in turn the Kantian category of causality and dependence because it is a category that 
obeys the principle of respect of the act and  
C is the special status of author of that person in respect of which preaches the duty.  
Dogmatic approach as hypothetical trial, because it is possible to check, the consequence for 
violation of a duty and not the domain of fact paves the way for the nature of that duty. Both the 
Kantian categories and the Kantian judgments expressed in all transcendental analytic can be 
summarized as follows:  
We cannot ignore that this constellation of thinkers is situated on the European horizon of 
modernity
  26,which  historically  has  a  break  between  the  classical  view  and  consists  of  the 
metaphysics of being, in which man acts, exists and lives on “in Depending on where in all 
beings "
27 and the modern view of the metaphysics of the subject, which in turn understands the 
man from another perspective, placing him in the center of the universe, conceiving him as a 
guiding principle of all processes of intervention in the reality and lead to his knowledge. This 
philosophical path assures the man himself as a subject, a self that knows the extent of his will, 
his positive or negative actions that take part of the conscious and directed to the end. The object 
of knowledge does not constitute as an unknown being, metaphysically unattainable, because his 
                                                           
26 Ibíd, EUSEBI COLOMER p. 7. 
27 Ibíd, p. 8.   
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place  is  taken  by  the  knower  (I),  acquiring  the  idealistic  perception,  an  anthropological 
foundation. 
The Cartesian view that involves the initiation of a claim for the autonomy of the individual 
subject's consciousness, nurtured by Kant with the figure of the transcendental subject will reach 
its  ultimate  limits,  imposing  great  heights  in  understanding  the  system  of  thought  of  Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1,770-1831)  with the absolute self, passing through the stages of the 
self  target  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte  (1762-1814)  and  the  subjective  self  in  Friedrich  Wilhelm 
Joseph Schelling (1775-1854). 
 
IV.  The  Metaphysical  Foundation  of  the  Dogmatic  Category  of  Legal  Duty  in  the 
Transcendental Subject of Immanuel Kant 
Understanding of the Kantian system must be addressed from the particular theory of knowledge 
which involves fundamental aspects of metaphysics, ethics, morality and teleology of nature, 
however, the law, religion, and history are treated as aspects of a great philosophy of culture. 
From the start, Kant located the law as a particular epistemological of your Metaphysik der Sitten 
(1797)
28  and as reasonable consequence of your praktische Kritik der Vernunft (1788)
29 that tries 
to answer the question, What should I do? 
Kant believes that there is a lack of freedom in the man that is within the margins of the 
social pact: but it is not a nostalgic memory of the freedom he enjoyed in the state of nature, 
absolute freedom and chaos that was assigned, at least partially, to recover it after in a formal 
way by the intervention of a subject created, the legislature, located in head of the rule of law. 
The lack of freedom that concerns the great thinker is the inability to do always and everywhere 
public use of reason itself
30, Kant finds this statement in the historical constitution of the Prussian 
society of the XVIII century that rested on four pillars; a) the crown, b) the property, c) the 
Lutheran clergy and d) public administration and justice, which demanded compliance with his 
orders, to the point that was cited, not without some irony, the popular phrase of Federico II of 
Prussia (1712-1786) Begründen sie, wie sie und über das, Was Du willst, aber gehorcht!
 31 This 
was to be expected in a typical monarch, representative example of enlightened despotism. Public 
use of pure practical reason allows of no limitation, no space or time, is part of that countless core 
                                                           
28 Metafísica de las Costumbres.  
29 Crítica de la Razón Práctica. 
30 Was ist Aufklärung? 
31 ¡Razonad cuanto queráis y sobre todo lo que queráis, pero obedeced!  
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personality called access to knowledge. From there, the access to courts or get access to prompt 
and effective response from the administration materialized with the establishment of the right of 
petition (art. 23 c.pol.) and different rituals are the result of procedural Kantian conception of 
guarantee unrestricted free public use of reason. The person is not deprived, in criminal matters, 
but of one their rights, the freedom of movement and that is temporarily because there is no 
constitutional  mandate  beyond  redemption  penalties.  Therefore  the  other  freedoms,  speech  - 
spoken  or  written-suffrage,  equality  of  religion,  association,  education  and  teaching,  are 
intangible.  
The duties of citizenship derive then the public use of reason in a free manner, embodied in 
the obligation of the citizen who has to answer for their tax burdens while preserving the freedom 
to express or not agree with the tax burden. The duty of the administration of justice by providing 
a straight and effective justice, prompt and complete, and there are differences among their staff 
regarding their operation or convenience. Kant is where it first appears, perhaps receiving the 
echoes  of the French Revolution,  the freedom  to apply to  certain  laws, the principles of:  a) 
conscientious objection and b) civil disobedience.  
Metaphysics of morals unites two major methodological structures metaphysical principles 
of law and the metaphysical principles of morality based not on the morality of the action, but its 
legality.  
The crime in genere will therefore be, in the strictest Kantian sense, a violation of the law. 
Marked by legal regulatory framework, enshrined as a warning but a ban, the legal consequences 
for the implementation of this act, Therefore, there is a duty that is limited to the field of ethics or 
morals, That does not interest the criminal law. But there is a legal duty, detached from personal 
motives and interests, enshrined in the law that imposes a specific course of action for the citizen 
and the official. That has limits to the exercise of justice and is based always on the faculty that, 
the obligation that the other has, is fulfilled.  
Kant is based on a priori synthetic judgment that could be described as follows:  
The power that a citizen has to require another citizen the obligation to fulfill the duty is the 
result that my freedom is compatible with the freedom of others.  
The principle of Universality of Duty Work outside in such a way that the free use of your 




Kant used a foundation of general logic,  
 
                                           - x - = +  
 
The negation of negation leads to an affirmation. You can say that when the state prevents the 
violation of freedom (negative behavior) of an act that violates the freedom (negative behavior) 
states freedom. The act that prevents the violation of freedom is legitimate violence, allowed for 
the protection of that extra-legal basis. This is a principle of law is that freedom is a consequence 
of complying with a duty by the state and its servers. This parole duty to which Roxin referred to 
is none other than an obligation for guaranteeing freedom of partners. When a special obligation 
(intraneus) gives in to a term extension of seeking an illegal and freedom of a person, what 
actually happens is that it guarantees the principle of freedom of public use of reason. In the same 
way the judge who compels another to obtain for himself or a third party money or promise 
thereof to provide a decision favorable to their interests, in breach of the duty free exercise of 
practical reason that requires honesty and transparency. While the legal relationships between 
individuals are ruled by the principle of mine and yours, respect for contractual freedom of others 
and non-interference in private protection orbits outside. This would have strong descent in the 
domain  theory  made  based  on  the  Latino  principle  neminem  laedere  and  subsequently  bonn 
radical functionalists rotularía offenses under organizational competence. The use of freedom 
for the citizen must be compatible with the freedom of other citizens under a universal law. This 
law would not harm the other which comes from the modern contractualism although Cicerón 
already referred to it.  
Legal relations between the special required and participants in the criminal action of Kant, 
who conceived of man as part of a society, a people, acquiring its maximum expression in the 
criminal legal thought of Günther Jakobs, for whom the person lives in a world already formed 
(crimes institutional competence) and their rules are those that are established to ensure balance 
between the relationship of those individuals who assume the social role of citizens. Kant himself 
defines what is meant by area:  
A set of rational laws that govern the actions of the company he built under the social pact. 
The duty of the state-based headed by each of its officers, located in different segments of 
competition, operates under the principle of necessity (warranty) to keep the exercise of human 
freedom. That duty is embedded in the law, but as a result of affirmative action in the legislative  
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process, but even then in the state of nature and obeying the principle of conservation man has a 
duty to act to defend you or a third party to ensure that the whole group can develop their most 
essential activities. The external standard as a positive act is of a later factor although there is as 
rational necessity of coexistence. 
While it is true that the role of the state is punishing criminals who invade orbits of outside 
discretion when the cracking of the public use of reason is done by the head of state in their 
servers (duty) what is violated is the duty parole to use freely at any time and space my pure 
practical reason. Manifests as:  
You must leave the state of pure nature to get along with others and in relationships of 
coexistence necessary in a state of law, that is, distributive justice.  
Functionalist conceptions of the lord of fact, made a contribution to others and institutional 
competence are based on the Metaphysics of Kant’s morals. Thanks to this, the author goes back 
to social contract theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) which carries the hypothetical 
representation of a large assembly of people at a time and a determined place, resolved to place 
absolute limits on their freedom, which incidentally is an act of absolute freedom to place at the 
head of an independent third partial assignments that each had made. That party is none other 
than the state, conceived as governing body and subject of administration which would conform 
to enter subsystems organized justice and social control in providing it promptly and effectively.  
The philosophical reason for the existence of prison is this:  
¡That under the social contract, men gave up part of their right to freedom of movement and 
accordingly that freedom can be restricted on a temporary and provisional way when developing 
for the subject of agent, behavior that will seriously offend against coexistence rules!  
In the same sense we can preach the philosophical foundation of the criminal procedural 
possibility of interception of epistolary communication, telephone or data left on the network 
thanks to the internet browsing; The reason is that under the social contract, the privacy rights of 
each of the subscribers of the covenant and people who attended the hypothetical assembly were 
transferred in part. In the same direction the event is referable to the legal form of entry and 
search  where  what  is  transferred  is  partly  right  to  privacy  within  the  framework  of  private 
property while adhering to certain circumstances and under specific conditions, which legitimate 
the coercive intervention of the state. The sacrifice of liberty is a partial assignment that regards 
the autonomy of the person. Although Kant believes that the natural state of freedom as such did 
not exist, as the act of forming an original pact and giving up some of my rights is an act of  
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freedom which restricts the operability of a conception of that freedom without limits, the highest 
expression of self-determination of individuals, the public use of reason, but freedom anyway. 
Kant says that freedom is innate, savage, to get another formal freedom, but it is freedom after 
all, freedom pure and simple. 
The duty that we are interested in for the validity of this essay is the one that arises under the 
original partnership agreement with a contractual view of it as to comply with the rule of law as a 
receiver of freedoms ceded, acquired after revival of the principle of sovereignty and operates in 
practice to guarantee the freedom of each of the members of the social compact. The reason why 
there is such a social compact is that in my freedom I decide so a third, the State, regulate it 
normatively  to  guarantee  coexistence.  When  the  judicial  officer  or  public  servant  of  the 
administration in any order acts, he is held under a security position that assigned freedom, the 
public use of pure practical reason and as a result of an agreement of wills that has legitimized 
the man as a legislator and has decanting into a positive normative, the rules of behavior.  
The punishment as a retributive response to the breach of duty to guarantee the exercise of 
freedom is constituted as a categorical imperative since it will deny the act that prevents freedom 
and preventing me from enjoying my freedom, what that is doing is to ensure the exercise of that 
freedom. Hegel then will assume a dialectical position on this and it will pose as the ratio where 
capital punishment is the negation of the act that denies the norm, which is the illegal act and that 
ultimately what capital punishment does is an affirmation of the rule. The teleology of this duty is 
absolute respect for the man since Kant considered an end in itself and never as means.  
Fulfilling the duty to guarantee freedom corresponds to a person's ontological connotation, 
which, being an end in itself should develop its freedom in the public use of reason. We will 
structure an overview of the Kantian view in the following context:  
 
i) To begin with, it is necessary to make clear that the body's most powerful doctrinal Kantian 
argument is limited to each of their criticisms: a) Critique of Pure Reason (1781), b) Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788), and c) Critique of Judgement (1790), and the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797) that culminates their critical period of reason and Applying this to the phenomena  of 
morality and legality.  
 
ii) The concept of criticism should not be taken as censure or reproach, as is fundamentally 
confused in colloquial language, but in the original vision of the Aristotelian language, such as  
19 
study or beginning of an activity, so the critique of pure reason is nothing other than the study of 
pure reason and pure is a priori, that is not yet is based on experience, hence the term: critique of 
pure reason will also study a priori reason or away from the experience.  
 
iii) The neo-Kantians have established the purity of science to the extent that there is the same 
relationship or interaction systems, but we believe that the purity of a theory is based on the a 
priori of the same, a pure theory of law is an a priori theory of law based on pure concepts, ideals, 
and not contaminated with the thing itself, there is only relation to the thing when and to the 
extent that this becomes the object of knowledge.  
 
iv) Kant considered the proposals, theses, or statements such as judgments, so that if you say: A 
infringes a duty of protection when it displays the behavior required to rescue B, we will in the 
presence of a proposition that essentially involves a grammatical subject (S) and a predicate (P), 
subject is who they say something about, predicate is what is said about the subject, therefore it is 
said that subject A  violated the duty of protection because as a parent of B, did not display the 
behaviors that were due and so was the result. 
These  judgments,  in  its  most  primal  essence,  do  not  refer  to  experiences  or  sensitive 
situations,  but  a priori structures  of reason,  are factual statements about a specific situation, 
character and logical propositions that are susceptible to truth or falsity. Notice that Kant runs 
counter to the basis of any formal logic so far prevailed, as the realism Aristotelian syllogism was 
based on premises from which the trial could not be predicated of truth or falsity simply accused 
the trial correction. In that sense, what we have is that Kant's theory of opinion believes that there 
are two major structures:  
 
1. The Analytic Judgments 
Characterized in that the predicate of the proposition is contained in the concept of the subject, so 
that Kant, in his classic example of the triangle defined as having three angles, inferred that the 
three  angles  predicate  is  contained  in  the  triangle  concept  (subject).  It  is  about  necessary 
universal judgments that depend on the principle of identity.  
We  cannot  say  that  the  legal  duty  is  a  trial  analytical  parole  because  the  true  nature 
automatically excludes the valuation is made on their ability to produce knowledge, while it will 
always be true and consistent legal proposition that there is a legal duty parole governing the  
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guiding principle of the performance of special duties is being valued as true or false. A is B, is a 
tautology because they are a priori in nature and are not marked by the experience (pure). The 
duty of the judicial officer to act emanating from inside the law, is not possible to understand as 
an analytical framework duty as there is no legitimacy for their existence in the subject itself but 
it  is  thanks  to  the  incumbent  or  the  functional  position  that  the  required  special  obligation 
acquires.  
 
2. The Synthetic Judgments 
Synthetic judgments are a posteriori, dependent on the guarantee that gives them the experience 
they are defined as when the predicate (p) is not contained in the subject (s) and therefore must 
go  to  the  experience  to  establish  the  true  dimension  of  the  trial.  These  judgments  are  so 
particular, quotas and could be classified as true or false.  
Its basis of legitimacy is denoted on the experience and that Kant states in his Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft with the standard formulation: Heat dilates the body, where heat is a concept 
whose  sensory  experience  can  only  come  through  the  experience  of  feeling  in  certain  body 
somatic effects.  
Accordance with the foregoing the predicate: dilates the body, is not contained in the subject 
and thanks to  this  we must go to  the lab experience or taking the data from  observation to 
conclude that indeed anybody (a metal) subjected to heat, undergoes expansion. Therefore they 
are true if and only if the experience supports it and live verifying continuously. At this point and 
time it is necessary to establish that Kant appeals to an interesting surprise attack to justify the 
structure  of  sensitive  and  it  uses  pure  concepts  a  priori,  not  intelligible.  Kant  explains  the 
synthetic lawsuit from a priori concept that underlies and is demonstrable not only by reason. 
These concepts which Kant uses and calls categories are none other than time and space.  
Kant believes that all events or phenomena perceptible by reason and become an object of 
knowledge are framed within the parameters of time and species. Space and time is the here and 
now, is to be in and the other is be now, or being before or after. So Kant feels it cannot conceive 
of the thing without the space but the space can be conceived without the thing. This situation is 
explainable when based on the doctrine of space as a concept a priori (pure), understood as a 
constraint only where real objects (entities) have a place.  
If a public servant coerces a person to provide for him or pay money for a proper act of his 
duties, this action is to take place in a here and a now. Kant states that the modalities of time and  
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space are pure character, not affordable by the experience or sensation but from a concept of 
logical reason.  
The jurisdiction of the special obligation to act in a certain way and ultimately ensure the 
legal order is a problem that for Kant is categorical in nature. It is a matter of time and space.  
The characteristics of space are that it is a priori category, regardless of experience; the 
experience takes place in space and time, in a place and at one point, the perceived thing takes 
place in space and is appropriate for itself as an object of knowledge.  
The  action  described  in  the  crime  must  fit  into  the  above  categories.  It  seems  obvious 
because the occurrence of the event is a logical description of nature. This is where Kant refers to 
a three-dimensional that radical functionalism knows by the name of areas (organizational and 
institutional powers), what Habermas and before him, Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) had referred 
to him as operability worlds of human behavior.  
The area within the more established stock Kant is a concept which (mental unit) includes 
beings  and  things.  But  the  subject  is  not  only  subjective  as  to  make  the  thing  an  object  of 
knowledge. It must also project the objectivity and therefore conceives of space as a condition of 
knowledge of the thing.  
The intraneus in the development of the civil service act in time and space. We cannot 
accept the validity of Aristotelian realism to Kant which survived as a virus, where one could not 
free the independent knowledge of the object itself. However, the concept of duty has no reason 
to be if there isn´t a person or group of persons for which preaches the need for such duty.  
The concept of duty is a priori in which things are located, so that the duty is not part of 
reality and it is a mental exercise. This inference makes the duty grounds for obligation.  
It does not exist in the ontic reality, in the object itself, which would take us into the realm of 
metaphysics, a being called a duty, a priori character. It exists as space and time, but not pure 
reason but practical reason. The nation's first conquest Kant, is to purge the legal science of faults 
or remnants of Aristotelian realism, which was not alien or even Descartes, who incurs in him, 
not  the British idealists (Berkeley and Hume) nor the realism of Leibniz's monadic.  
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V. Recension of the Judgments and Categories 
 




"all A is B" 




"some A is B" 
Plurality 
Singular 










"A is not B" 
Negation 
Infinite 










Inherence and Subsistence 
(substance and accidents) 
Hypothetical 
"if A is B, then it is C" 
Causality and Dependence 
(cause and effect) 
Disjunctive 
"A is B,or C, D, ...." 
Community 





“A can be B” 
Of the 
mode 
Possible - Impossible 
Assertoric 
"A is actually B" 
Existence - Non-existence 
Apodictic 
"A  necessarily is B" 
Need - Contingency 
 
The rule of law has a hypothetical structure. This is a trial where the legal consequence is the 
legal effect of a budget that in fact has been infringed by the subject. Criminal behavior in the 
course of conduct which has its roots in the parole violation of a duty and not in the domain of  
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causal course the existence of that duty (surveillance, protection, rescue) is  not  autonomous, 
because underlying the functional role of public servants to meet the expectations of legislation in 
force that builds society's own rule of law. 
 
Conclusions 
 Professor  Jürgen  Habermas  considers  that  a  theory  of  communicative  action  is  the 
beginning of a theory of society. An interpretation of social time from new structures which is 
based (given because of their critical canons) and that he had already charted earlier (almost a 
decade) when he raised it in zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, It is a theory that structures 
understanding and not as an extension or approach to a theory of knowledge.  
 
 The foundations of this theory of action dates back to Talcott parssons in the structure of 
social action, 1957, (historical reconstruction and conceptualization) however, and he himself 
admits, led him into error. 
 
 Structure of his theory:  
a) Concept of communicative rationality (communicative reason), 
b) Concept of society, divided into two (2) levels, which articulates the world of life and the 
system and  
c) A modern theory that explains the type of social pathology is now becoming increasingly 
visible, with the hypothesis that communicatively structured areas of action are subject to the 
constraints of formally organized action systems that have become autonomous.  
 
 A theory involving the union in its development of concepts and history as categories of 
knowledge is a clear legacy of Parssons, where undoubtedly Habermas shares. Although he does 
it with some nuances that do not detract from the attribution of influence to classical sociology, 
for Habermas, classic is all authors that have something to say: Weber, Mead, Durkheim and 
Parsons.  
 We could not ensure the internal rational structure of action oriented to understanding if 
we had not already had before us, albeit fragmentary and distorted way, the existing form of a 
reason to be sent embodied symbolically and historically situated. Just as he relates: rationality is 
a loaded concept of normative content.   
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 Criminal law is conceived as the science that is based on the unlawful conduct of the 
person who structureS normative expectations regarding the social group. 
 Criminal  behavior  is  a  breakdown  in  communication  and  illocutionary  ideal  brought 
about between the standard and the subject, consisting of respect for the legal order that splits 
the collective confidence in the inviolability of the same.  
 The legal duty to respond to normative expectations, Metal framed of the fundamental 
intraneus, emerges as a policy ingredient of the theory of the crimes of breach of duty, not taking 
the criteria of the domain of fact. 
 Communicative rationality in the criminal legal standard is added based on the existence 
of the concept of duty (of salvation, protection, surveillance) is understood to be incorporated in 
order to the extent that it is created by the faculty of reason and/or of knowing. 
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